

Warfare By Other Means

"Armed nonstate actors have received increasing attention since September 11th, 2001, both from scholars and from policy makers and soldiers--and with this attention has come a vibrant debate about whether nonstate civil warfare and insurgency is the future of war, and if so, how it should be countered. Yet underlying these debates is one crucial shared assumption: that states and nonstate actors fight very differently. Biddle upturns this distinction in How Nonstate Actors Fight, examining actual military methods to show that many nonstate actors now fight more "conventionally" than many states. Rather than a dichotomy, Biddle frames nonstate and state methods along a continuum and presents a systematic theory to explain any given nonstate actor's position on this spectrum. His theory emphasizes how actors' internal politics - especially their institutional maturity and war aims - determine their military choices. In doing so, Biddle bridges to largely opposing groups of scholarship: materialists who assume that material and structural constraints will lead nonstates to prefer irregular warfare, and culturalists who see nonstate warmaking as connected to social norms. Biddle integrates both materialist and cultural considerations into this theory, but emphasizes internal politics as the chief determinant of how any actor will fight. The first four chapters present Biddle's theory, and the next five test it across a range of historical examples, from Lebanon to Iraq to Somalia to Croatia to the Vietcong"--

This book analyzes the evolution of Russian military thought and how Russia's current thinking about war is reflected in recent crises. While other books describe current Russian practice, Oscar Jonsson provides the long view to show how Russian military strategic thinking has developed from the Bolshevik Revolution to the present. He closely examines Russian primary sources including security doctrines and the writings and statements of Russian military theorists and political elites. What Jonsson reveals is that Russia's conception of the very nature of war is now changing, as Russian elites see information warfare and political subversion as the most important ways to conduct contemporary war. Since information warfare and political subversion are below the traditional threshold of armed violence, this has blurred the boundaries between war and peace. Jonsson also finds that Russian leaders have, particularly since 2011/12, considered themselves to be at war with the United States and its allies, albeit with non-violent means. This book provides much needed context and analysis to be able to understand recent Russian interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, how to deter Russia on the eastern borders of NATO, and how the West must also learn to avoid inadvertent escalation.

The new defense challenge confronting the United States involves a range of nontraditional warfare threats that are far different from the large-scale conventional or nuclear threats posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Now at the forefront, thr.

Professor Kerry K. Gershaneck's study on the People's Republic of China's (PRC) political warfare stands as a major contribution to the body of knowledge regarding this existential threat to the United States, its freedoms, and its values. He provides a well-researched and wide-ranging overview of the nature of the PRC threat and the political warfare strategies, doctrines, and operational practices used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Further, Professor Gershaneck offers detailed and illuminating case studies of PRC political warfare operations designed to undermine Thailand, a U.S. treaty ally, and Taiwan, a close friend.This book is not merely an academic study. It is also based in great part on Gershaneck's extensive experience working in the fields of national intelligence, counterintelligence, international relations, strategic communications, and academia during the course of more than 35 years, at times literally on the front lines combatting PRC political warfare. He witnessed firsthand the United States at its zenith in the political warfare fight as well as its subsequent abandonment of high-level political warfare organization, education, and operations at the end of the Cold War.As commander of U.S. Marine Corps Force Pacific in the early 2000s, I observed a disturbing trend, based in large part on the United States' dismantlement of its own political warfare apparatus. It was becoming increasingly apparent that American government, business, academics, culture, and other elites were losing the ability to identify and confront PRC political warfare. By the time I assumed duties as U.S. assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs in 2009, America's unwillingness and inability to recognize and challenge Beijing's malign persuasion, intimidation, coercion, infiltration, and subversion was even more evident. Even within the highest levels of the U.S. Department of Defense, with senior leadership focused more on combat operations in Southwest Asia than the rapidly emerging threat from China, it was very difficult to shift focus and resources to addressing the PRC.

This volume undertakes a systematic analysis of the relationship between Special Forces and contemporary strategy, explaining the resurgence of interest in Special Forces, particularly in the West, by exploring their appeal over traditional conventional force options in the current 'War on Terror'. Special Forces, Terrorism and Strategy comprises four overarching themes: theory and practice command and control culture and technology operations and the 'War on Terror'. By developing a credible theory about the role of Special Forces in contemporary strategy, Alastair Finlan assesses the changing character of the relationship between conventional forces and Special Forces, illustrating the prominent role of these forces in the 'War on Terror'. This book will be of great interest to students of strategic studies and military history, as well as for professional military colleges.

Bachelor Thesis from the year 2008 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Region: USA, Harvard University, language: English, abstract: The present thesis examines the factors that led to the development of counterinsurgency doctrine in the United States Army and Marine Corps, focusing on the period from 1898-1940, and why the two organizations had strikingly different approaches and beliefs about the importance of this doctrine. When the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz described war as “simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means,” he was writing primarily with reference to conventional warfare between the national armies fighting for the achievement of a specific set of political objectives. However, Clausewitz's understanding of war is equally applicable to a different kind of warfare: revolutionary warfare, defined by John Shy and Thomas Collier as “the seizure of political power by the use of armed force.” In this type of warfare, the insurgent force attempts to gain political power (usually the power of the state) while the counterinsurgent force—usually the state, although sometimes supported by outside actors—attempts to retain its hold on political power. Revolutionary war is at its heart a struggle for the support of the people, an explicitly political kind of warfare. The problems of waging a successful counterinsurgency have plagued military experts for centuries. In a counterinsurgency, the strengths of a conventional military power are turned into weaknesses, as applying overwhelming force is generally counterproductive to the goal of winning popular support. For most conventional military forces, fighting a counterinsurgency means changing the organization's very way of thinking about warfare. Military organizations known for their technological and conventional warfare prowess are forced to adopt new strategies and ideas when faced with the harassing tactics of insurgents who need only strike when it suits them, while the counterinsurgent force must defend everything, everywhere, at all times. Isolating the insurgents from the population becomes the foremost goal of the counterinsurgency, requiring a delicate and shifting balance of offensive, defensive, and political operations often quite separate from the normal scope of military training and preparation.

This text explores the methods of highly unconventional warfare conducted by South Africa's secret intelligence and covert warfare units, always highly deniable and one step away from the official war machine during the final years of apartheid.

[Vicarious Warfare](#)

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[China's Master Plan to Destroy America](#)

[Battling to the End](#)

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[Irregular Warfare in the Information Age](#)

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[A Study of United States Economic Warfare Against Japan, 1940 - 1941, Prelude to World War II and Pearl Harbor, Embargo, Naval Blockade Consideration, Freezing Assets](#)

['On War' in the Twenty-First Century](#)

[Warfare by Other Means](#)

[Twenty-First Century Threats and Responses](#)

What people are saying about Inside Cyber Warfare "The necessary handbook for the 21st century." --Lewis Shepherd, Chief Tech Officer and Senior Fellow, Microsoft Institute for Advanced Technology in Governments "A must-read for policy makers and leaders who need to understand the big-picture landscape of cyber war." --Jim Stogdill, CTO, Mission Services Accenture You may have heard about "cyber warfare" in the news, but do you really know what it is? This book provides fascinating and disturbing details on how nations, groups, and individuals throughout the world are using the Internet as an attack platform to gain military, political, and economic advantages over their adversaries. You'll learn how sophisticated hackers working on behalf of states or organized crime patiently play a high-stakes game that could target anyone, regardless of affiliation or nationality. Inside Cyber Warfare goes beyond the headlines of attention-grabbing DDoS attacks and takes a deep look inside multiple cyber--conflicts that occurred from 2002 through summer 2009. Learn how cyber attacks are waged in open conflicts, including recent hostilities between Russia and Georgia, and Israel and Palestine Discover why Twitter, Facebook, LiveJournal, Vkontakte, and other sites on the social web are mined by the intelligence services of many nations Read about China's commitment to penetrate the networks of its technologically superior adversaries as a matter of national survival Find out why many attacks originate from servers in the United States, and who's responsible Learn how hackers are "weaponizing" malware to attack vulnerabilities at the application level

This compelling account charts the historical emergence of vicarious warfare and its contemporary prominence. It contrasts its tactical advantages with its hidden costs and potential to cause significant strategic harm.

The essays in this volume analyze war, its strategic characteristics and its political and social functions, over the past five centuries. The diversity of its themes and the broad perspectives applied to them make the book a work of general history as much as a history of the theory and practice of war from the Renaissance to the present. Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age takes the first part of its title from an earlier collection of essays, published by Princeton University Press in 1943, which became a classic of historical scholarship. Three essays are repinted from the earlier book; four others have been extensively revised. The rest--twenty-two essays--are new. The subjects addressed range from major theorists and political and military leaders to impersonal forces. Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Marx and Engels are discussed, as are Napoleon, Churchill, and Mao. Other essays trace the interaction of theory and experience over generations--the evolution of American strategy, for instance, or the emergence of revolutionary war in the modern world. Still others analyze the strategy of particular conflicts--the First and Second World Wars--or the relationship between technology, policy, and war in the nuclear age. Whatever its theme, each essay places the specifics of military thought and action in their political, social, and economic environment. Together the contributors have produced a book that reinterprets and illuminates war, one of the most powerful forces in history and one that cannot be controlled in the future without an understanding of its past.

Rebooting Clausewitz offers an entirely new take on the work of history's greatest theorist of war. Written for an undergraduate readership that often struggles with Clausewitz's master work On War--a book that is often considered too philosophical and impenetrably dense--it seeks to unpack some of Clausewitz's key insights on theory and strategy. In three fictional interludes Clausewitz attends a seminar at West Point; debates the War on Terror at a Washington think tank; and visits a Robotics Institute in Santa Fe where he discusses how scientists are reshaping the future of war. Three separate essays situate Clausewitz in the context of his times, discuss his understanding of the culture of war, and the extent to which two other giants--Thucydides and Sun Tzu--complement his work. Some years ago the philosopher W.B. Gallie argued that Clausewitz needed to be 'saved from the Clausewitzians'. Clausewitz doesn't need saving and his commentators have contributed a great deal to our understanding of On War's seminal status as a text. But too often they tend to conduct a conversation between themselves. This book is an attempt to let a wider audience into the conversation.

On War (1832) is a treatise on the philosophical aspects of warfare by Prussian general, scholar, and strategist Carl von Clausewitz. Published posthumously by the author's wife—who edited his manuscript and wrote the book's introduction—On War is one of history's most important works on warfare and military strategy, and continues to be studied to this day. With a background in art, culture, and history, and with extensive experience as a combat veteran, Clausewitz sought to understand the military success of such figures as Napoleon and Frederick the Great. What interested Clausewitz the most was how these leaders effectively mobilized entire nations to launch military campaigns larger and more violent than any in European history. Although he initially began with the theory that war was one aspect of a population's struggle for survival, he eventually came to believe that war was a method of imposing the will of one state on another. By privileging politics and philosophy in his study of warfare, Clausewitz changed the way military figures, politicians, and scholars thought of and perpetrated the process of war. Most crucially, Clausewitz suggests that war serves no purpose in and of itself, but rather acts as an instrument of a political party or group. In addition, Clausewitz believed that strong moral and political motivations—especially in the case of defense—greatly increased the chance of victory. On War was read and interpreted by Vladimir Lenin, Mao Zedong, and Dwight Eisenhower, and has, for over a century and a half, continued to shape the concept and conduct of war. With a beautifully designed cover and professionally typeset manuscript, this edition of Carl von Clausewitz's On War is a classic of history, philosophy, and military theory reimaged for modern readers.

2020 Facsimile of the 1999 Edition. Unrestricted Warfare is a book on military strategy written in 1999 by two colonels in the People's Liberation Army. Its primary concern is how a nation such as the People's Republic of China can defeat a technologically superior opponent (such as the United States) through a variety of strategies. Rather than focusing on direct military confrontation, this book instead examines a variety of other means. Such means include using International Law (see Lawfare) and a variety of economic means to place one's opponent in a weakened position and circumvent the need for direct military action. Of the various strategies discussed perhaps the most relevant is that of attacking networks. Networks are increasingly important in not only data exchange but also transportation, financial institutions, and communication. Attacks that disable networks can easily hamstring large areas of life that are dependent on them for coordination. One example of network warfare would be shutting down a network that supplies power. If there is a significant failure in the power grid caused by the attack, massive power outages could result, crippling industry, defense, medicine, and all other areas of life. The English translation of the book was made available by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service in 1999. Errors in translations are the sole responsibility of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and not of Albatross Publishing.

2020 Hardcover Facsimile of the 1999 Edition. Unrestricted Warfare is a book on military strategy written in 1999 by two colonels in the People's Liberation Army. Its primary concern is how a nation such as the People's Republic of China can defeat a technologically superior opponent (such as the United States) through a variety of strategies. Rather than focusing on direct military confrontation, this book instead examines a variety of other means. Such means include using International Law (see Lawfare) and a variety of economic means to place one's opponent in a weakened position and circumvent the need for direct military action. Of the various strategies discussed perhaps the most relevant is that of attacking networks. Networks are increasingly important in not only data exchange but also transportation, financial institutions, and communication. Attacks that disable networks can easily hamstring large areas of life that are dependent on them for coordination. One example of network warfare would be shutting down a network that supplies power. If there is a significant failure in the power grid caused by the attack, massive power outages could result, crippling industry, defense, medicine, and all other areas of life. The English translation of the book was made available by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service in 1999. Errors in translations are the sole responsibility of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and not of Albatross Publishing.

[Nonstate Warfare](#)

[Ancient Warfare: A Very Short Introduction](#)

[Blurring the Lines between War and Peace](#)

[War by Other Means](#)

[Carl Von Clausewitz](#)

[Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age](#)

[Spec Ops](#)

[Rebooting Clausewitz](#)

[Inside Cyber Warfare](#)

[A Survey of 20th-century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization](#)

[South Africa in the 1980's and 1990's](#)

[The Military Methods of Guerillas, Warlords, and Militias](#)

Contains the 6th century B.C. Chinese commander's classic work on the art of warfare, the relationship between war and politics, and diplomacy, and the Prussian soldier's classic work on the nature of war and the conditions which require it.

At a time when unprecedented change in international affairs is forcing governments, citizens, and armed forces everywhere to re-assess the question of whether military solutions to political problems are possible any longer, Martin van Creveld has written an audacious searching examination of the nature of war and of its radical transformation in our own time. For 200 years, military theory and strategy have been guided by the Clausewitzian assumption that war is rational - a reflection of national interest and an extension of politics by other means. However, van Creveld argues, the overwhelming pattern of conflict in the post-1945 world no longer yields fully to rational analysis. In fact, strategic planning based on such calculations is, and will continue to be, unrelated to current realities. Small-scale military eruptions around the globe have demonstrated new forms of warfare with a different cast of characters - guerilla armies, terrorists, and bandits - pursuing diverse goals by violent means with the most primitive to the most sophisticated weapons. Although these warriors and their tactics testify to the end of conventional war as we've known it, the public and the military in the developed world continue to contemplate organized violence as conflict between the super powers. At this moment, armed conflicts of the type van Creveld describes are occurring throughout the world. From Lebanon to Cambodia, from Sri Lanka and the Philippines to El Salvador, the Persian Gulf, and the strife-torn nations of Eastern Europe, violent confrontations confirm a new model of warfare in which tribal, ethnic, and religious factions do battle without high-tech weapons or state-supported armies and resources. This low-intensity conflict challenges existing distinctions between civilian and soldier, individual crime and organized violence, terrorism and war. In the present global atmosphere, practices that for three centuries have been considered uncivilized, such as capturing civilians or even entire communities for ransom, have begun to reappear. Pursuing bold and provocative paths of inquiry, van Creveld posits the inadequacies of our most basic ideas as to who fights wars and why and broaches the inevitability of man's need to "play" at war. In turn brilliant and infuriating, this challenge to our thinking and planning current and future military encounters is one of the most important books on war we are likely to read in our lifetime.

Nations carry out geopolitical combat through economic means. Yet America often reaches for the gun over the purse to advance its interests abroad. Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris show that if U.S. policies are left uncorrected, the price in blood and treasure will only grow. Geoeconomic warfare requires a new vision of U.S. statecraft.

"This explosive book explores the methods of highly unconventional warfare conducted by South Africa's secret intelligence and covert warfare units, always highly deniable and one step away from the official war machine during the final years of apartheid. It is mostly compiled from first hand of operators who took part."--Http://www.galago.co.za.

Vice Adm. William H. McRaven helped to devise the strategy for how to bring down Osama bin Laden, and commanded the courageous U.S. military unit that carried it out on May 1, 2011, ending one of the greatest manhunts in history. In Spec Ops, a well-organized and deeply researched study, McRaven analyzes eight classic special operations. Six are from WWII: the German commando raid on the Belgian fort Eben Emael (1940); the Italian torpedo attack on the Alexandria harbor (1941); the British commando raid on Nazaire, France (1942); the German glider rescue of Benito Mussolini (1943); the British midget-submarine attack on the Tirpitz (1943); and the U.S. Ranger rescue mission at the Cabanatuan POW camp in the Philippines (1945). The two post-WWII examples are the U.S. Army raid on the Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam (1970) and the Israeli rescue of the skyjacked hostages in Entebbe, Uganda (1976). McRaven—who commands a U.S. Navy SEAL team—pinpoints six essential principles of “spec ops” success: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. For each of the case studies, he provides political and military context, a meticulous reconstruction of the mission itself and an analysis of the operation in relation to his six principles. McRaven deems the Son Tay raid “the best modern example of a successful spec op [which] should be considered textbook material for future missions.” His own book is an instructive textbook that will be closely studied by students of the military arts. Maps, photos.

A leading foreign correspondent looks at how social media has transformed the modern battlefield, and how wars are fought Modern warfare is a war of narratives, where bullets are fired both physically and virtually. Whether you are a president or a terrorist, if you don't understand how to deploy the power of social media effectively you may win the odd battle but you will lose a twenty-first century war. Here, journalist David Patrikarakos draws on unprecedented access to key players to provide a new narrative for modern warfare. He travels thousands of miles across continents to meet a de-radicalized female member of ISIS recruited via Skype, a liberal Russian in Siberia who takes a job manufacturing "Ukrainian" news, and many others to explore the way social media has transformed the way we fight, win, and consume wars-and what this means for the world going forward.

*Includes pictures *Includes a bibliography for further reading Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz died almost 200 years ago, yet he remains one of the most important and influential of all military thinkers. His teachings combined strategy with military knowledge to produce a dialectic approach to the philosophy of warfare, and his work is still widely taught in military academies around the world. There are few senior military leaders anywhere who are not familiar with his seminal book, On War. In fact, with the exception of Napoleon Bonaparte, no man was more influential on the military tactics and strategy of 19th century warfare than Clausewitz, a Prussian soldier and military theorist who stressed the moral and political aspects of war. On War was mandatory for all military students and officers to read during the 19th century, and it was common practice for generals during the American Civil War to carry Clausewitz's treatise and read it to assist them in strategy and tactics. On War covered every conceivable facet of warfare, using historical battles as examples of what to do and what not to do. The treatise discusses how opposite forces interact, and how unexpected new developments unfolding under the "fog of war" called for rapid decisions by alert commanders. In opposition to Antoine-Henri Jomini, he argued war could not be quantified or graphed or reduced to mapwork and graphs. Perhaps most importantly, Clausewitz realized the correlation between politics and war. Clausewitz had many aphorisms, of which the most famous is, "War is not merely a political act, but also a political instrument, a continuation of political relations, a carrying out of the same by other means." This view of warfare is still the standard viewpoint of war today. What it is easy to overlook is that during his life and in the period when On War was first published, Clausewitz was regarded as a fairly insignificant figure, but in hindsight it's easy to understand why his concepts have stood the test of time. While other military theorists focused on aspects of war that were applicable only to the tactics, equipment, and weapons of a particular period, Clausewitz looked instead at the philosophy which underpinned the strategy of warfare, something that remains unchanged by military technology or politics. Indeed, that approach has ensured Clausewitz remained relevant despite changes in tactics and technology. Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin studied Clausewitz and referred to him as "one of the great military writers," and the strategy of deterrence pursued by the United States during the Cold War was inspired in part by President Dwight D. Eisenhower's reading of Clausewitz's book as a young officer in the Army in the 1920s. General George S. Patton was an avid reader of Clausewitz, as was Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong, who organized a Clausewitz seminar for Communist Party members in the 1930s. The influential British military writer and thinker Basil Liddell Hart was clearly influenced by Clausewitz's writings. The list of those who were directly influenced or inspired by their reading of Clausewitz would cover many pages, so it's all the more remarkable that On War was not completed at the time of his death in 1831. It was left to his widow, the Countess Marie von Brühl, to gather together writings that her husband had been working on for a number of years and pull these together into the book, which was first published in 1832. Nearly 190 years later, On War remains one of the most significant and brilliant expositions on political-military analysis and strategy ever produced, and it is also still one of the most influential books ever written on military (and non-military) strategic thinking.

[The Continuation of Terran Politics by Other Means](#)

[On War](#)

[Political Warfare](#)

[Strategies for Combating China's Plan to "Win Without Fighting"](#)

[Of War and Law](#)

[The Art of Political Warfare](#)

[Warfare By Other Means](#)

[Image Warfare in the War on Terror](#)

[Learning, Relearning, and Unlearning. The Development of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in the United States Army and Marine Corps, 1898-1940](#)

[Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice](#)

[Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms](#)

[Conversations with Benoit Chantre](#)

Drawing parallels between war and politics, the author explains why military principles can be applied to an understanding of the events, concepts, concerns, issues, and practices of political life.

A new era of great power competition places a strategic premium on the efficiency with which states can pursue their aims. There is therefore likely to be an expanded scope for partnered operations. Partner force capacity building has a long history, with very mixed results, yet there is little historical memory in the institutions tasked with archival research, interviews with practitioners, and observation of capacity building to understand why states undertake it, how they should select, train and equip their partners, and how they should manage the generation and withdrawal of trainers.

Modern war is law pursued by other means. Once a bit player in military conflict, law now shapes the institutional, logistical, and physical landscape of war. At the same time, law has become a political and ethical vocabulary for marking legitimate power and justifiable death. As a result, the battlespace is as legally regulated as the rest of the world. Kennedy examines this important development, retelling the history of modern war and statecraft as a tale of the changing role of law and the dramatic growth of law's power. Not only a restraint and an ethical yardstick, law can also be a weapon--a strategic partner, a force multiplier, and an excuse for terrifying violence. Kennedy focuses on the ways that military and military planners speak the same legal language--wrong for humanitarianism, and wrong for warfare. He argues that law has beaten ploughshares into swords while encouraging the bureaucratization of strategy and leadership. A culture of rules has eroded the experience of personal decision-making and responsibility among soldiers and officers inside and outside the military who wish to reduce the ferocity of battle to understand the new roles--and the limits--of law. Only then will we be able to revitalize our responsibility for war.

A comprehensive analysis of strategic information warfare waged via digital means as a distinct concern for the United States and its allies. In the "information age," information systems may serve as both weapons and targets. Although the media has paid a good deal of attention to information warfare, most treatments so far are overly focused on the economic espionage. He then establishes a conceptual framework for the successful conduct of strategic warfare in general, and of strategic information warfare in particular. Taking a historical perspective, he examines U.S. efforts to develop air bombardment capabilities in the period between World Wars I and II and compares them to U.S. efforts to develop the capability to conduct strategic information warfare. He concludes with recommendations for strengthening U.S. strategic information warfare defenses.

The first documented, systematic study of a truly revolutionary subject, this 1937 text remains the definitive guide to guerrilla warfare. It concisely explains unorthodox strategies that transform disadvantages into benefits.

Greek and Roman warfare differed from other cultures and was unlike any other forms of warfare before and after. The key difference is often held to be that the Greeks and Romans practised a 'Western Way of War', where the aim is an open, decisive battle, won by courage instilled in part by discipline. Harry Sidebottom looks at how and why this was constructed and maintained by the Greeks and Romans, why this concept is so popular and prevalent today, and at whether or not this is an accurate interpretation. All aspects of ancient warfare are thoroughly examined - from philosophy and strategy to the technical skills needed to fight. He looks at war in the wider context - how war affected the individual's identity could be constructed by war, for example the Christian soldier fighting in God's name. He also explores the ways in which ancient society thought about conflict: Can a war be just? Why was siege warfare particularly bloody? What role did divine intervention play in the outcome of a battle? Taking fascinating examples from the Trojan Wars, Sidebottom uses arresting anecdotes and striking visual images to show that the any understanding of ancient war is an ongoing process of interpretation. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to read quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.

The International Committee of the Red Cross's study of Customary International Humanitarian Law by Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (Cambridge University Press, 2005) contains a unique collection of evidence of the practice of States and non-State actors in the field of international humanitarian law, together with the study's compilation of rules of customary law based on that assessment. The study invites comment on its compilation of rules. Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law was originally published in 2007, and results from a year-long examination of the study by a group of military lawyers, academics and practitioners in the field of international humanitarian law. The book discusses the study, its methodology and its rules and provides a critical analysis of them. It adds its own contribution to scholarship on the interpretation and application of international humanitarian law.

[War by Others' Means](#)

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[The Book of War](#)

[Modern Warfare](#)

[On Guerrilla Warfare](#)

[Image Munitions and the Continuation of War and Politics by Other Means](#)

An analysis of the status of computer network attacks in international law.

In *Battling to the End* René Girard engages Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), the Prussian military theoretician who wrote *On War*. Clausewitz, who has been critiqued by military strategists, political scientists, and philosophers, famously postulated that "War is the continuation of politics by other means." He also seemed to believe that governments could constrain war. Clausewitz, a firsthand witness to the Napoleonic Wars, understood the nature of modern warfare. Far from controlling violence, politics follows in war's wake: the means of war have become its ends. René Girard shows us a Clausewitz who is a fascinated witness of history's acceleration. Haunted by the French-German conflict, Clausewitz clarifies more than anyone else the development that would ravage Europe. *Battling to the End* pushes aside the taboo that prevents us from seeing that the apocalypse has begun. Human violence is escaping our control; today it threatens the entire planet.

Three years before the September 11 bombing of the World Trade Center—a Chinese military manual called *Unrestricted Warfare* touted such an attack—suggesting it would be difficult for the U.S. military to cope with. The events of September 11 were not a random act perpetrated by independent agents. The doctrine of

total war outlined in Unrestricted Warfare clearly demonstrates that the People's Republic of China is preparing to confront the United States and our allies by conducting "asymmetrical" or multidimensional attack on almost every aspect of our social, economic and political life.

War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age argues that two intimately connected grassroots trends—the rise of insurgencies and the rise of the web—are putting modern armies under huge pressure to adapt new forms of counterinsurgency to new forms of social war.

This study examines the role of American economic warfare against Japan prior to the outbreak of World War II. Beginning with Japan's invasion of China in 1937 and continuing with the outbreak of World War II, the Roosevelt administration and the majority of Americans could not ignore the plight of friendly nations nor overlook foreign threats to American interests. Even as China, Britain and France struggled for survival, however, Americans supported only measures short of war, wishing to aid friendly nations while avoiding involvement in hostilities. The Roosevelt administration responded to these conflicting goals by pursuing policies many critics have described as confusing, devious and ineffective. Historians examining United States Far Eastern policy prior to Pearl Harbor have emphasized the nation's devotion to the open door in Asia and resistance to Japanese expansion. They have also stressed American and Japanese political and military decisions leading to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Most scholarly efforts have inadequately explored the Roosevelt administration's program of economic warfare against Japan during 1940 and 1941 and how it influenced the direction of American – Japanese relations during those crucial years. From President Jefferson's commercial embargoes during the Napoleonic wars to the Confederacy's effort to embargo cotton during the Civil War, and, most recently, when President Carter embargoed wheat to the Soviet Union in 1980, the American experience in economic warfare has been unsuccessful. The Prussian soldier-philosopher, Carl Von Clausewitz once wrote war is a continuation of politics through other means. If this is true, as it is widely believed to be, then economic sanctions are more than a form of diplomatic pressure: They are a form of warfare. What, then, was the Roosevelt administration endeavoring to accomplish when it employed sanctions against Japan? Was it trying to deter Japan from attacking British, Dutch, and American territories? Was it trying to encourage Japanese leaders to negotiate? Was it trying to undermine Japan's military and economy? Or was it seeking to use symbolic gestures to mobilize Americans to support more interventionist foreign policies? The answers to these questions are linked to Roosevelt's styles of leadership and administration, rivalries among his lieutenants, conflicts among government agencies, public opinion, and interplay between diplomatic and military policies. These were the crucial forces influencing the Roosevelt administration's handling of the Japanese threat.

[Mapping the Cyber Underworld](#)

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[The Russian Understanding of War](#)

[The Life and Legacy of the Prussian General Who Wrote On War](#)

[Toward Combined Arms Warfare](#)

[Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law](#)

[South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s](#)

[Unrestricted Warfare](#)

[Delivering Effective Partner Force Capacity Building](#)

[War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age](#)